INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt represents the most significant shift in the Court's abortion jurisprudence in decades. 1 However, as this Article shows, Hellerstedt does not represent the clean break from prior abortion jurisprudence that some identify. Instead, the decision comes at the end of a decades-long movementcountermovement conflict about the meaning of an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman's right to choose abortion.
Positioning Hellerstedt in historical context matters because doing so underscores the Court's ongoing responsiveness to popular views of what the Constitution says about abortion. 2 The history studied in this Article also reveals what should happen when the Court considers fetal-protective, rather than woman-protective, antiabortion laws. To maintain the delicate balance created by Casey, the Court should require evidence that both fetal-protective and woman-protective abortion regulations are substantially related to their stated goal.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the evolution of a liberty-enhancing undue-burden test developed by the pro-choice movement during the 1970s. This idea took root in the political arena when abortionrights supporters worked to show that reproductive rights and children's best interests were not diametrically opposed. Movement attorneys reworked these arguments when challenging new abortion regulations in court, borrowing from free exercise, welfare rights, and right-to-travel jurisprudence. Over time, these activists began working to make an undue-burden test synonymous with the requirement that abortion laws substantially serve their stated goal.
Part II studies the evolution of an alternative understanding of the undue-burden test developed by the pro-life movement in the 1980s and 1990s. As the Court sometimes used undue-burden rhetoric, pro-life lawyers positioned the Court's use of the undue-burden test as nothing more than rational basis review. Pro-lifers argued for a different understanding of tailoring requirements: If the legislature set out a sufficiently important purpose, courts should defer to lawmakers without questioning the fit between the means and ends of a statute.
Part III positions Hellerstedt in the history of the movementcountermovement conflict about the undue-burden test. Hellerstedt clarifies how courts should approach abortion regulations that purport to protect women's health. However, when put in historical context, Hellerstedt also represents an opportunity to give more guidance about how the undue-burden test applies to any regulation.
Casey's undue burden test strikes a careful balance between the state's interests and women's constitutional liberty. 3 To maintain this balance, even if a law is designed to protect fetal interests, legislators must demonstrate a substantial relationship between legislative purpose and the means used to accomplish it. Requiring such an explanation would help the courts to differentiate laws promoting a sincere, if divisive, interest in fetal life from those primarily intended to stigmatize abortion or reinforce a particular view of women's proper role in society. At the same time, demanding an explanation of how a law protects unborn and born children should make for a more meaningful application of Casey. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
I. A LIBERTY-PROTECTIVE UNDUE-BURDEN TEST
For some time, pro-choice advocates have associated the undue-burden test with the Court's retreat from protecting abortion rights, 4 but it was not always that way. In the 1970s and early 1980s, as the Court backed away from strict adherence to the trimester framework, abortion rights activists and attorneys created an undue-burden test that would maintain protection for reproductive rights. 5 If the Court was willing to uphold regulations that restricted abortion access before viability, movement members hoped to provide the justices with a framework that would preserve key constitutional protections.
This Part chronicles the rise of this approach. First, it explores the political roots of a pro-choice vision of a constitutional undue burden. This campaign grew out of a longstanding debate about the harms experienced by unwanted children. 6 Seeking to reconcile the rights of children and women, activists argued that abortion bans were poorly tailored to accomplish their stated end, harming children as much as protecting them. 7 Several years after Roe, the Court upheld certain pre-viability abortion restrictions, encouraging abortion-rights supporters to rework claims about the tailoring of abortion laws. 8 When pro-life activists successfully promoted abortion funding bans, members of the abortion rights movement looked for a more robust complement to the trimester framework. Drawing on unconstitutional conditions doctrine, these attorneys argued that women faced an impermissible choice between receiving government benefits and exercising a protected constitutional right. 9 When the Court rejected this argument, movement attorneys 4 See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women's Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 291 (2010) (arguing that the undue burden test "has fostered extensive encroachments on women's personal privacy" and that Casey "opened the door to physical, familial, and spiritual invasions of women's privacy that serve little purpose but public shaming and humiliation."); Gillian Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. . 5 See infra Part IE. 6 See infra Part IC. revised their understanding of an undue burden. 10 By the mid-1980s, prochoice activists did not abandon an undue-burden framework, but instead made it shorthand for the requirement that the means and ends of abortion regulations be substantially related to one another.
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A. Psychologists Map Out the Damage Done to Unwanted Children
The idea of an undue burden took shape partly during the debate about the effect of family planning and abortion restrictions on unwanted children. In 1961, when Yale professor Fowler Harper argued in Poe v. Ullman that Connecticut's ban on contraceptive use for married couples was unconstitutional, 12 members of an emerging family planning movement insisted that birth control restrictions did not effectively serve their stated goal of protecting the family. The Poe brief contended: "Scientific opinion is that unwanted children are unhappier than planned children and are more likely to become anti-social." 13 Because unwanted children experienced "maternal hatred," they were more likely to be racially prejudiced, mentally ill, and willing to break the law.
14 In this formulation, birth control bans sabotaged the marital families those laws were intended to protect.
Harper's Poe brief reflected a broader claim about children's right to be wanted. The reasoning behind a right to be wanted came into view in the 1920s and 1930s, with the growth of what historian Kathleen Jones calls the "child guidance" industry. 15 In the 1920s, as Estelle Freedman and John D'Emilio have shown, "a distinctive subculture took shape among the middle class young."
16 This "youth culture" sparked unprecedented anxiety among parents and other authority figures. 17 As Ben Lindsey, a juvenile court judge, explained: "Not only is this revolt from the old standards of conduct taking place, . . . but it is unlike any revolt that has ever taken place before."
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In the face of shifting patterns of social and sexual behavior among the young middle-class, white parents often turned to manuals and psychologists 10 According to the 1920s child guidance literature, maternal rejection mattered primarily because of the damage it did to the larger society.
23 In Levy's view, a child's "hunger for maternal love" could explain everything from ordinary misbehavior to full-blown juvenile delinquency. 24 Maternal rejection also initiated a vicious cycle, damaging children who later had a "lack of any emotional ties" with their own children.
25
B. Family Planning Activists Transform Arguments About Unwanted Children
Beginning in the 1940s, family planning activists reworked maternal rejection claims, reformulating them as a rationale for changing laws on contraception. Writing in 1949, Mrs. R. N. Edelman of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America explained the goal: "Any program that can reduce parental hostility and thereby lessen the tragedy of the child's rejection is a contribution to family security and society."
26 By forcing parents to bring unwanted pregnancies to term, the law ensured that unwanted children would suffer the trauma of maternal rejection. More worryingly, unwanted children could spell the end to otherwise stable families. Commentators tied divorce and "family instability" to a couple's failure to plan a family -a failure explained partly by harsh and restrictive contraception laws.
27
By the 1950s and 1960s, in the wake of a panic about juvenile delinquency, members of Planned Parenthood painted a dire picture of the consequences of "compulsory pregnancy," including a perceived spike in juvenile delinquency. 28 While opponents of birth control argued that access to contraception encouraged sexual promiscuity and other bad behavior, Planned 19 See JONES, supra note 15, at 122. 20 Id. at 181-82. 21 See id. at 183. 22 Id. at 174-75. 23 See id. at 182. 24 Id. 25 Parenthood leaders insisted that unwanted children were more likely to commit crimes.
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Consider the 1960 case of Virginia McLaughlin, a mother whose daughter already had two children by the age of fourteen. 30 McLaughlin allegedly advised her daughter on how to use and obtain "rubbers," and on this basis, prosecutors charged McLaughlin with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 31 Harriet Pilpel and other Planned Parenthood leaders responded that it was immoral to deny people access to birth control, because unwanted children were likely to misbehave.
32
Planned Parenthood leader William Vogt also tied juvenile delinquency to uncurbed population growth and unwanted children. 33 In criticizing the delinquency reforms recently championed by then-New York State Attorney General Jacob Javits, 34 Vogt wrote: "It is well known that unloved and 'rejected' children are prone to becoming neurotics. Much juvenile misbehavior shows a marked neurotic pattern." 35 Vogt further contended that some working mothers, many of them likely poor, were guilty of "maternal neglect." 36 In either case, Vogt insisted: "Perhaps these poor youngsters should never have been born at all to parents who, because of their own deficiencies, are unable to provide children the emotional and spiritual environment indispensable to their health." 37 Vogt's comments reflected a new spin on the rhetoric of maternal rejection forged by therapists in the 1920s and 1930s. Starting after World War II, the perceived growth of poor populations at home and abroad inspired a new social movement centered on concerns about the Cold War, international instability, and the costs of aid to the poor. 38 Prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, the population control movement included refugees from the eugenic legal reform movement of the early twentieth century, anti-poverty activists, and Cold War hawks, all of whom agreed on the need to re- 29 39 Partly because of the influence of eugenics supporters, some activists argued that population growth naturally involved a decline in the "quality" of the population, since the poor and "unfit" -the very groups that most contributed to increasing crime rates -tended to have more children. 40 According to some population controllers, expanding the use of legal contraception would decrease population growth and perhaps reduce crime and welfare expenses. 41 As a preliminary draft of the Population Council Charter explained, such initiatives could also reverse "a downward trend in the genetic quality of the population."
42 As Vogt put it, unplanned pregnancies tended to plague those suffering from "deficiencies" -persons who could never be good parents.
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C. Family Planners and Abortion-Rights Supporters Make a Claim for Children's Rights
In the 1940s and 1950s, leaders of organizations like Planned Parenthood played up the social harms produced by unwanted children, including growing welfare rolls, crime rates, and an out-of-control pace of population growth. By the 1960s, as feminists and environmentalists exerted greater influence over the family planning movement, activists translated concerns about the unwanted child into constitutional arguments. Instead of presenting unwanted children as a social problem, the leaders of groups like Planned Parenthood and the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL, later the National Abortion Rights League) began characterizing legal contraception (and later abortion) as a right owed to children themselves. 44 These new children's rights arguments debuted in Poe v. Ullman, a constitutional challenge to Connecticut's contraception ban. 45 The disputed statute prevented married persons from using contraception. 46 Harper's brief argued that the challenged contraceptive ban actually undermined its stated end rather than serving it. 50 The brief focused on a mismatch between the means and ends of the Connecticut law. 51 By outlawing contraceptives for married couples, Connecticut sought to preserve traditional family structures. But according to the brief, the Connecticut law shattered the family and damaged the psyche of both members of a married couple and any unwanted child they had after being denied contraceptive access.
52 Since "sex life is essential for a satisfactory marital union," contraceptive bans contributed to a rise in marital breakdown and divorce. 53 By contributing to the births of unwanted children, the law created social harms that far outweighed any of its benefits, thereby offending the balancing aspect of the Due Process Clause.
After the Poe majority held that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction to resolve the appeal, 54 in Griswold v. Connecticut, attorney Catherine Roraback and Yale law professor Thomas Emerson again highlighted arguments about the unwanted child in mounting a second attack on the Connecticut law.
55 Doctrinally, Emerson and Roraback's brief became known for its articulation of the privacy right implicated by contraception bans. 56 The brief also addressed the proper level of scrutiny applicable to this new right, asking whether the law was "arbitrary and capricious" and "reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose." 57 According to the Griswold brief, the harms experienced by parents and children as the result of an unwanted pregnancy severed any relationship between the means and ends of the Connecticut law.
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In Griswold, rather than addressing the issue of unwanted children, the Court adopted a different constitutional analysis, the notorious "penumbral" theory -the Bill of Rights contained penumbras and therefore implied the 48 Brief for Appellants at *10-11, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961) 61 As the group explained, the law served "no valid public purpose at all," partly because "the statute creates unwanted children, who not only suffer a large share of that insidious crime known as 'childabuse,' but also a higher rate of juvenile delinquency, failure in school, drug addiction, and mental illness, than do wanted children." 62 While arguments like the ones made by Human Rights for Women took shape in battles about contraception, the abortion wars prompted a fundamental reworking of constitutional arguments about unwanted children. As the anti-abortion movement developed arguments about the rights of the unborn, activists had more reason to present themselves as invested in the wellbeing of children. 63 Finally, pro-choice advocates gradually exercised greater influence over a divided abortion-rights movement, moving it away from earlier rhetoric involving population control. 64 In response to these new developments, the leaders of groups like NARAL and the National Organization for Women (NOW) explained what the law owed to children, borrowing from an evolving language of human rights. 65 In particular, drawing on the idea of social, cultural, and economic rights, advocates connected abortion access for women to children's interest in quality of life after birth. 66 In this context, quality of life did not have the eugenic implications associated with pro-abortion arguments based on population control. Instead, activists tried to put the right to life in context, spot-lighting important interests in love, support, and socioeconomic security after birth. 67 Framed in this way, allowing women to control their fertility advanced children's right to be wanted and to enjoy the financial support and love more often available to intended children.
D. The Right to Be Wanted
In the years immediately before and after the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, leaders of the abortion-rights movement devised a new conception of children's rights. Movement members continued to make arguments about the social ills that some associated with unwanted children -the high illegitimacy rates and the potential crime and welfare costs some linked to unintended pregnancy. At the same time, as the pro-life movement focused attention on the unborn child, and as the identity of the abortion-rights movement shifted, activists had more reason than ever to emphasize the rights of children.
While the antiabortion movement remained fragmented before 1973, pro-life activists dramatized the personhood of the unborn child, presenting slideshows on fetal life and acting as guardian ad litem for fetuses scheduled to be aborted. 68 Without always challenging the idea that women had an interest in bodily integrity or privacy, pro-lifers carved out what they saw as a more fundamental right to life belonging to the unborn child. 69 Strategically, abortion-rights activists had reason to present themselves as the true defenders of children's rights. Moreover, advocating for children's rights reflected many activists' genuine interest in the wellbeing of mothers and children after birth -an interest demonstrated by demands for state and federal support for healthcare, continuing education, family planning, and protection against sex discrimination.
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In the early 1970s, activists within both NARAL and NOW began arguing that compulsory pregnancy violated the rights of both women and children. 71 Instead of serving the stated goal of protecting children's lives at 67 On some occasions, pro-choice advocates highlighted a mismatch between legislative means and ends to smoke out the impermissible purposes underlying a law theoretically designed to protect children. For example, Marion Treadwell Barry, an influential African-American feminist, used the idea of social and economic rights to castigate pro-life legislators: "While rejecting abortion, these very men refuse to fund quality, inexpensive preand post-natal care for women denied access to abortion. While rejecting legalized abortion, these very men refuse to fund quality education and training for the children of the women without access to abortion." 76 At the state and federal level, NOW members further emphasized the disconnect between the means and ends of the supposedly child-protective laws. While testifying against a constitutional amendment banning abortion, Betty Friedan described unwanted children as its ultimate potential victims.
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According to Friedan, safe and legal abortion ensured "the right of children to be born to loving parents."
78 Speaking on behalf of other abortion-rights activists, Friedan explained: "We consider the quality of human life to be a priority, the right of a child to be wanted." 79 The harms once spotlighted by population controllers became injuries against which lawmakers should protect children. As Friedan reasoned:
[T]he unwanted children are going to be abused; these are the children who are likely to grow up criminally delinquent or violent themselves. So, [ State chapters of NOW elaborated on this idea of children's rights. Unwanted children almost necessarily lost out on crucial rights, for "the child that is born against the will of his mother because an abortion was not available, suffers the ultimate rejection, the ultimate insult -of not being wanted in the world." 81 NOW activists maintained that Roe v. Wade 82 and Doe v. Bolton 83 advanced important rights for children to quality of life. As NOW explained: "The US Supreme Court decisions, affirming a woman's right of choice in abortion, shall usher in an era, where every child will be loved, wanted, and cared for."
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By mid-decade, abortion-rights supporters sought to translate these arguments into constitutional law. This effort drew on the language from the Supreme Court's early decisions on minors' access to abortion. Starting in 1976, the Court did not apply Roe's trimester framework in a straightforward way. Instead, the justices vowed to strike down only unduly burdensome regulations. 85 Movement leaders seized on this language as an entry point for rethinking constitutional abortion doctrine as a whole.
At first, abortion-rights activists looked to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine forged by the Supreme Court in the 1960s. 86 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine "holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether."
87 Movement attorneys initially argued that abortion-funding bans created just such a condition on women's right to choose. 88 Even early on, however, movement attorneys suggested that a unique undue-burden test applied to abortion doctrine.
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Particularly as the Court made clear that it would uphold some first trimester restrictions, movement attorneys used undue-burden reasoning to explain that many regulations had the functional effect of eliminating abortion access. 90 Invoking an undue burden, abortion-rights supporters started urging the courts to examine the fit between the means and ends of a law. 85 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1977) (reasoning that abortion "right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy"); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (holding that law involving abortion rights of minors "is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion"). 86 See Brief of Appellees, supra note 9, at 14-15. 87 Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 REV. , 1415 REV. (1989 . 88 See, e.g., Brief of Appellees, supra note 9, at 14-15. 89 See id. at 20-22. 90 See id. 91 See id. [Vol. 52
E. The Court Hints at the Existence of an Undue-Burden Test
1976 proved to be a watershed year for lawyers dedicated to protecting constitutional abortion rights. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court upheld several provisions of a Missouri law even though those measures applied early as well as late in a woman's pregnancy, including an informed consent regulation, a statutory definition of viability, and a recordkeeping requirement for all abortion clinics.
92 Danforth suggested that the Court would not simply focus on the state's interest or the phase of pregnancy, as Roe had suggested. 93 In Bellotti v. Baird, a case evaluating a parental consultation law, the justices made explicit what Danforth had suggested: At least under certain circumstances, the Court looked to more than the trimester framework in analyzing abortion regulations and would apply the undue-burden test. 94 The Court evaluated a Massachusetts law requiring minors to receive the written consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion.
95 A three-judge district court had held the statute unconstitutional; finding that the lower court should have abstained pending construction of the statute by state courts, the justices vacated and remanded, certifying questions about the proper interpretation of the law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
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The Court used undue-burden rhetoric to frame the question to be answered by the state court: whether the law "create [ tion doctrine was unique, involving questions of balancing the constitutional rights of parents against the less expansive constitutional rights of juveniles, in the context of abortion.
102 Nevertheless, supporters of abortion rights looking at the undue-burden test saw the possibility of something more. Given that the Court had already upheld certain restrictions applicable in the first trimester, pro-choice attorneys hoped to ground doctrinal analysis in something more compelling than Roe's trimester framework. If properly understood, the undue-burden test offered just such an opportunity.
F. Abortion-Rights Supporters Create Their Own Undue-Burden Test
In the mid-1970s, when a number of states and cities introduced laws banning the use of public money or public facilities for abortion, abortionrights attorneys saw broader potential in the idea of an undue-burden test.
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In 1976, Congress moved to ban the use of Medicaid funding for elective abortions. 104 NOW joined other pro-choice organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in arguing that the Medicaid ban would "hit poor women first and hardest." 106 Roraback, Katz, and their colleagues challenged the law in 1974, at first primarily arguing that it was preempted by the federal Social Security Act. 107 After the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Social Security Act was neutral on abortion funding, the district court struck down the Connecticut regulation on constitutional grounds, and the state successfully sought review by the Supreme Court. 108 [Vol. 52
Well known for her work on Griswold, 109 Roraback worked with Katz and argued in their brief to the Court that the case "was about the state's ability to use a public benefit program to penalize the exercise of a fundamental right." 110 Maher came less than a decade after a series of decisions on the right to travel suggesting, as Roraback and Katz put it, that "the withholding of public benefits can constitute an unwarranted interference with Constitutional rights is now beyond debate." 111 The brief pointed to a pair of cases, Shapiro v. Thompson, an opinion striking down a one-year residency requirement for state welfare recipients, and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, which struck down a one-year residency requirement for those seeking publicly funded non-emergency medical care. 112 In Roraback and Katz's view, Shapiro and Maricopa County showed that a "challenged regulation need not necessarily prevent the exercise of a Constitutional right;
[t]he law prohibits as well a penalty imposed upon persons who assert the right in question." 113 Roraback and Katz also turned to free exercise jurisprudence for guidance. 114 In particular, the brief referred to Sherbert v. Verner, a 1963 case where the Court had held that South Carolina could not withhold unemployment benefits from a Seventh Day Adventist unable to find work because her religion treated Saturday as the Sabbath. 115 Roraback identified a similar burden at work in Maher: just as the religious believer in Sherbert had to choose between gainful employment and her religious beliefs, women in Maher had to pick either the exercise of their rights or access to welfare benefits.
women from seeking abortions. 120 Similarly, in Danforth, the Court had struck down a ban on saline abortions because the measure would have "the effect of inhibiting the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." 121 An undue burden arose whenever a law effectively eliminated most women's access to abortion. If a law created such an undue burden, Roraback argued that a statute was constitutional only if it served a compelling state interest.
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To be sure, as Part II argues, feminists and pro-choice activists came to view the idea of a freestanding undue-burden test with wariness. Any hint that the undue-burden test could replace strict scrutiny review seemed dangerous to those already worried that the Court had retreated from its protection of abortion rights. Indeed, over time, pro-choice attorneys concluded that anything less than strict scrutiny was tantamount to the complete overruling of Roe v. Wade. 123 In the 1970s, however, movement lawyers using the idea of an undue burden pointed out the real-world impact of an abortion regulation that stopped short of a formal ban.
Maher's use of the undue-burden test disappointed pro-choice attorneys. While adopting undue-burden rhetoric, the Maher Court disagreed with Roraback and Katz about its application. " [W] e have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion," wrote Justice Powell for the majority. However, when movement lawyers challenged federal Medicaid bans, a different, more abortion-specific understanding of the undue-burden test began to emerge. This shift started when the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of two funding bans, the federal Hyde Amendment and an Illinois law; both challenged laws banned Medicaid funding for all abortions unless a woman's life was at risk, including those procedures that a physician deemed to be medically necessary. 131 In Williams v. Zbaraz, the Illinois case, Planned Parenthood Federation of America repeated Lucas's argument in Kenley, applying unconstitutional conditions logic in a different way: while the law in Maher might have forced women to choose between an elective abortion and Medicaid benefits, Kenley required women to either lose their benefits or sacrifice their health. 132 While Maher had involved a choice between forgoing state benefits and exercising abortion rights, Planned Parenthood insisted that Williams concerned a far more suspect burden -"the substantial deleterious effects on . . . health" experienced by women denied medically necessary abortions.
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In Harris, the challenge to the Hyde Amendment, the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project (RFP) tried to move away from unconstitutional conditions reasoning.
134 Instead, the RFP described an undue-burden test that resembled some form of conventional heightened scrutiny: courts evaluating abortion restrictions had to consider the degree of interference with the abortion right and the strength of the justification for that interference. 135 Even if the government had a legitimate state interest, lawmakers could not advance that interest in "ways which unduly burden the freedom of the woman and her physician to protect her health." tions, the Hyde Amendment burdened women to a significant degree, forcing them to carry some health-threatening pregnancies to term, consuming poor women's already limited resources, or requiring them to seek illegal abortions. 138 According to the RFP, the Hyde Amendment did not set out any reasonable justification for its sweeping ban and therefore failed the undue-burden test. 139 While concluding that the Hyde Amendment was constitutional, the Court's Harris decision reconfirmed the importance of some version of the undue-burden test. 140 Reiterating that the Constitution "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy," the Court emphasized the source, rather than impact, of a burden on women's decisions. 141 Although women's interest in receiving needed medical care was important, the obstacle they faced resulted from poverty, not from the Hyde Amendment itself. 142 As the Harris Court reasoned: "The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency." 143 Pro-choice strategy in Harris evolved as the result of a decade-long experiment with undue-burden reasoning. In the political arena, family planners and abortion-rights supporters had first highlighted the mismatch between the means and ends of abortion laws in discussing the right of children to be wanted. These activists argued that sweeping abortion bans denied women autonomy while doing nothing to help children after birth.
As the abortion battle returned to the courts, movement lawyers brought up the fit between the means and ends of a law in the context of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. At first, pro-choice lawyers argued that the Constitution prohibited any state from forcing women to choose between exercising a fundamental right and receiving otherwise available health benefits. 144 Later, movement attorneys defined a potential threat to women denied medically necessary abortions as an impermissible burden. 145 Gradually, however, movement lawyers created an abortion-specific idea of an undue burden. This approach focused on the relationship between the purpose of a law and the means used to achieve it. 146 The more restrictive the law, as these attorneys argued, the more narrowly a law should be tailored to accomplish its end. Moreover, in evaluating the burden produced 138 See id. 139 by a law, pro-choice lawyers urged courts to examine the practical impact of a law, not just its formal terms. 147 As Part II shows, as pro-life groups made their own arguments about the undue-burden test, pro-choice attorneys often came to see the standard as an inferior alternative to strict scrutiny -a Trojan horse that would allow the Court to overrule Roe without saying so.
II. THE UNDUE-BURDEN TEST AND PRO-LIFE INCREMENTALISM
For pro-life advocates the undue-burden test came to make sense as part of a new overarching strategy called incrementalism. 148 For much of the 1970s, leaders of the movement prioritized a fetal-protective constitutional amendment that would ban abortion coast-to-coast. 149 But by mid-decade, the leaders of Americans United for Life (AUL), an Illinois pro-life group, advocated for a different approach, one centered on a litigation strategy to reverse Roe v. Wade. 150 In the late 1970s, Patrick Trueman, a leading member of the organization, explained on behalf of his colleagues: "The need for a full-time public interest law firm for the right to life movement has become very apparent to all involved in our cause." 151 In the late 1970s, AUL attorneys developed a close and sometimes competitive relationship with attorneys at the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), then the nation's largest antiabortion organization.
152 Both groups saw litigation as the start of a new tactical approach intended not to establish far-reaching fetal rights but a campaign to "chip away [ dence. 154 In either case, attorneys defended laws that formally allowed access to abortion but had functional impacts similar to the impacts of the legal bans clearly prohibited under Roe. 155 Next, this Part examines incrementalists' increasing emphasis on an undue-burden test in the 1980s, as attorneys jockeyed to shape the Court's understanding of a new approach to abortion regulations. As the Part shows, abortion opponents came to monopolize the undue-burden idea, convincing most pro-choice leaders that it was the same thing as a formal rejection of Roe. Finally, after closely analyzing Casey's definition of an undue burden, this Part explores how incrementalists capitalized on the 1992 decision. Taking TRAP laws as a crucial case study, the Article shows that pro-life approaches to the undue-burden test were intended to eliminate any tailoring requirement for abortion regulations.
A. Incrementalists Develop a Different Undue-Burden Test
For much of the 1970s, incrementalists gained ground by promoting laws that had the practical impact of outlawing abortion while theoretically leaving the abortion right untouched. TRAP laws served this agenda by imposing regulations so onerous and expensive that many clinics would have to close.
156 So too did funding bans defended by pro-life activists in the Court, putting abortion financially out of reach for many Medicaid recipients. 157 In the 1970s, a pro-life version of the undue-burden test served as a particularly important vehicle for this tactic.
From the beginning, incrementalists proposed laws intended to close clinics. In 1978, for example, AUL defended an Illinois model law that required all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital.
158 As more hospitals refused to perform abortions because of the stigma surrounding the procedure and the influence of Catholic hospitals, such laws promised to prevent women from accessing the procedure after the first trimester. 160 Pro-lifers contended that these regulations advanced the state's interest in protecting women's health -a governmental purpose explicitly recognized by the Roe decision. 161 Although the courts often struck down these laws, emphasizing that they singled out abortion clinics, incrementalists refused to give up on a court-centered strategy. "We must not . . . consider ignoring the courts in our effort to seek protection for the unborn," AUL explained in 1978.
162 "To do so would disenfranchise the pro-life voter because all significant legislation is, and will continue to be, challenged by our opponents in the courts." 163 The incrementalist attorneys behind TRAP laws immediately saw value in some kind of undue-burden test, particularly in defending funding bans. Throughout the 1970s, when the Court had adopted undue-burden rhetoric, its meaning was inherently ambiguous. Pro-choice attorneys saw the potential recognition of circumstances under which heightened -and even strict -scrutiny should apply to regulations that did not directly interdict abortion. Incremetalists, by contrast, saw undue-burden rhetoric as a signal that the Court would uphold a meaningful number of abortion restrictions.
AUL and NRLC sought to exploit the ambiguity of the undue-burden language in Williams and Harris. This strategy relied on the same logic underlying TRAP laws: the burden created by a law resulted not from the statute itself but rather from economic and political circumstances over which the government had no control. "Regardless of the nature of the woman's interest at stake, there exists no state action which impinges upon the woman's rights in this context," AUL argued in Williams.
164 AUL argued that the problem arose not because of the government but because of factors beyond its control, particularly "the refusal of the physician to render a particular treatment." 165 The NRLC explicitly contended that the undue-burden test -a far less protective approach -had replaced Roe's trimester framework.
166 "Where the obstacle does not impact upon the woman's freedom to make a constitu- 160 See, e.g., Americans United for Life, supra note 156, at 2. 161 tionally protected decision, or if they merely make the physician's work more laborious or less independent without any impact on the patient," NRLC asserted in Williams, "the regulations are evaluated under relaxed standards of scrutiny and the state is afforded broader power to encourage actions thought to be in the public interest." 167 The Court's decision in Harris intensified incrementalists' interest in the undue-burden test. In 1981, AUL attorneys contended that Harris and Williams had fundamentally changed the constitutional law governing abortion, clarifying "that the right to be free of undue governmentally imposed obstacles to abortion does not mean the right to require the government to obviate obstacles not of its own creation."
168 After Harris and Williams, AUL attorneys also concluded that the Court had backed away from protecting abortion providers. As the group explained: "physicians have no abortionrelated rights which are independent of the women they abort."
169 As prolife activists put greater focus on targeting clinics, the movement would use its idea of an undue-burden test to strip service providers of the remaining constitutional protections.
B. The Court Considers Multiple Approaches to the Undue-Burden Test
The future of both the undue-burden test and TRAP laws took center stage in City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive Health Services (Akron I), a 1983 case involving an ordinance that required, among other things, that all abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital. 170 In defending this provision, the AUL developed an elaborate argument about the application of the undue-burden test:
In evaluating the constitutionality of abortion-related legislation, a court should first ask whether a statutory provision impacts on the freedom of choice to abort or bear a child. . . . Laws which do not create obstacles in the way of an abortion do not impact on the liberty, whether they are laws which may influence a woman to carry her child to term, laws which impact on physicians who provide abortions, laws which assure the medical consultation without which the liberty does not exist, or laws protective of the fetus or of other state interests. Therefore, such laws are constitutional. The court's second inquiry should be whether statutory provisions that do impact on the Roe liberty do so in a manner that benefits or burdens its exercise. To the extent that a provision enhances the 167 exercise of the liberty, it should not be subject to strict scrutiny . . . This conclusion . . . suggests that laws in areas such as informed consent, pathological reporting, and hospitalization and waiting period requirements may be subject only to rational basis review since the impact of such provisions on the Roe liberty may be primarily to benefit its exercise. The Court's third inquiry should be whether any burden that does exist is substantial or insubstantial.
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The AUL brief suggested that the Court should defer to the legislature's understanding of whether a law benefitted or burdened the abortion right, as well as whether a law was substantially burdensome. 172 Obviously, the clinics challenging the hospital requirement believed that it burdened their patients' right to choose abortion. Nevertheless, the AUL suggested that the Court should not closely scrutinize the tailoring of laws claimed to benefit women. If designed to serve an important state interest, such laws should survive without a hard look at the fit between the ends of a law and the means used to achieve it.
173
In an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the United States, Solicitor General Rex Lee similarly insisted that the Court had already adopted an undueburden test that required considerable deference to state legislators.
174
"Whether or not a particular legislative enactment unduly burdens the abortion choice depends upon the resolution of competing public policy issues upon which reasonable people readily disagree," the brief asserted.
175 "Because the legislature has superior fact-finding capabilities, is directly responsible to the public for its resolution of the policy issues it treats, and has greater flexibility than the courts to fine-tune and redirect its efforts if a particular solution is ill-founded or unwise, the courts should test the constitutionality of legislation impacting upon the abortion choice by an appropriately deferential standard." 176 Although the Akron I Court rejected this argument, both pro-choice and pro-life attorneys understood that the meaning of the undue-burden test was increasingly contested. In a majority opinion by Justice Powell, the Court struck down much of the Akron ordinance. 177 In referring to the hospital requirement, the majority emphasized that it "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure. 180 Applying that standard, she reasoned that the entire Akron ordinance was constitutional, including the second trimester hospital requirement. 181 Restrictions created an undue burden only "in situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision," not wherever a state regulation only "'inhibit[ed]' abortions to some degree."
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Following Akron I, pro-choice activists and pro-lifers agreed that the meaning of the undue-burden test had taken on unprecedented importance. Recognizing that the Court had defined an undue burden in conflicting ways, AUL attorneys argued that the constitutionality of clinic-and hospital-based regulations was unclear.
183 Janet Benshoof of the RFP also recognized that members of the Court defined an undue burden in conflicting ways. The Akron I majority seemed convinced that "a state may enact some regulations 'touching' on a woman's right in the first trimester so long as such regulations have 'no significant impact' and so long as they are justified by important state health objectives."
184 By contrast, O'Connor would "find[ ] that the State has compelling interests . . . throughout pregnancy, and would require that state interference 'infringe substantially' or 'heavily burden' the abortion right before triggering strict scrutiny." 185 Benshoof suggested that challenging TRAP laws would be an important step in clarifying the meaning of the undue-burden test. 186 She explained: "Any first trimester regulation which can be shown to impose a burden on the exercise of the abortion right is invalid." Energized by the Court's receptivity to their definition of an undueburden test, pro-life lawyers reinvigorated their campaign for TRAP laws. These laws simultaneously advanced two core aspects of incrementalist strategy: the gradual elimination of abortion access and the improvement of the pro-life movement's image on issues of women's rights. 189 In 1989, the significance of these goals clearly surfaced when AUL hosted a legislative strategy conference designed to exploit the latest polling data on the abortion wars. 190 By that time, NRLC had already publicized the experiences of women who claimed to suffer psychiatric disorders as a result of abortion.
191 AUL leaders made arguments about post-traumatic abortion syndrome part of a larger push to change the movement's image. 192 "The [pro-life movement's] naturally strong focus on the unborn child neglects mention of the mother of that child," Mary Ellen Jensen, a public-relations specialist at AUL, told conference attendees. 193 "Communicating greater concern for the woman who faces the challenge of an unplanned pregnancy must be a key objective of any pro-life communications strategy." 194 Clarke Forsythe, one of the movement's most sophisticated attorneys, agreed:
We must use all our expertise, experience, and ingenuity to persuade [the justices] that Roe's legalization of abortion on demand has been bad for women and children in American society. . . . Abortion on demand has isolated women, subjected them to male coercion, maimed their bodies, and wounded their psyches. Evidence of these consequences must be brought before these uncertain justices to persuade them that Roe should be discarded once and for all.
TRAP laws like the ones introduced in Illinois in 1985 represented the perfect vehicle for these new woman-protective arguments. These laws had first gained support in the state after a 1978 exposé by the Chicago Sun Times on the state's abortion industry. 196 Working undercover, reporters revealed unsterile, dangerous, dishonest, and unprincipled practices at four Chicagoland clinics. 197 The 40 stories published by the Sun Times sparked new regulations, and in 1982, at the urging of the pro-life movement, the state introduced more detailed and onerous regulations. 198 In the decades to come, pro-lifers would renew the push for similar regulations when clinic scandals emerged in other states and cities. 199 When providers challenged those regulations in 1989, pro-life incrementalists celebrated. The leader of the Illinois Right to Life Committee, a NRLC state affiliate, told reporters that his colleagues hoped that the Court would agree to hear the case, Turncock v. Ragsdale. 200 "We want [the Court] to have as many opportunities as possible to look at Roe vs. Wade to overturn it or chip away at it some more," he explained. 201 Paige Cunningham, a leader of AUL, presented the state's targeted regulations as a necessary means of protecting women from abortion. 202 Not only did the law not create an undue burden, the Illinois measure was needed to keep women safe from "unqualified physicians, unsanitary conditions or debilitating injury." 203 The Court never heard Ragsdale because Illinois settled the suit. 204 Nevertheless, hoping that the Supreme Court was ready to overrule Roe, a variety of pro-life groups repeated related arguments about the undue-burden test in amicus curiae briefs in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a challenge to another multi-part Missouri law. 205 In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the Missouri law, questioning the ongoing legitimacy of Roe's trimester framework. 207 Although the majority did not explicitly address the undue-burden test, Justice O'Connor, writing in concurrence, described it as the best path forward. 208 After Webster, incrementalists celebrated what they saw as a meaningful victory for their understanding of the undue-burden test. According to the AUL, Webster had made clear that "Justice O'Connor's 'undue-burden' standard ha [d] replaced the 'strict scrutiny' standard of review." 209 Webster also marked a turning point in pro-choice understandings of the undue-burden test. Some movement members had thought of the undueburden standard as an alternative route to success. Insisting that the Court should apply strict scrutiny, these attorneys contended that certain abortion regulations also failed the undue-burden test. Between Webster and Casey, however, pro-choice leaders increasingly identified the undue-burden test as part of a sneak attack on legal abortion.
Partly for this reason, in the lead-up to Casey, Katherine Kolbert, Linda Wharton, and other attorneys at the Reproductive Freedom Project successfully promoted a strategy equating the undue-burden test with overruling Roe. At a 1991 meeting coordinating amicus advocacy in Casey, Kolbert and Wharton summarized the argument on which all pro-choice groups had agreed. 210 Pro-choice attorneys further agreed to argue that the undue burden test, already adopted by the Third Circuit earlier in the litigation of Casey, was "subjective" and "unworkable," resulting in "arbitrary and discriminatory distinctions." 212 In a separate memorandum, Kolbert and her colleagues ex-plained the reason for this strategy: a belief that "the inevitable loss of Roe" would "spark massive protest" that the movement could exploit.
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Just the same, when the Court agreed to hear Planned Parenthood v. Casey, pro-life incrementalists were uncertain of what to expect. AUL attorneys recognized that the Court could overrule Roe, strengthen its protections, or take a middle course by adopting some version of the undue-burden test.
214 Casey ultimately created a delicate balance that conformed to neither movement's earlier idea of an undue burden. This outcome did nothing to deter incrementalists invested in the undue-burden test. Over the course of the next two decades, incrementalists used TRAP laws to redefine Casey and promote their own understanding of the test, one that eliminated any relationship between the purpose and effect of a law.
C. Casey Adopts an Ambiguous Version of the Undue-Burden Test
For the first time, in Casey, the Court formally adopted a version of the undue-burden test. 215 The case involved a multi-restriction Pennsylvania law, but the Court also confronted questions about the ongoing validity of Roe.
216
In a divided opinion, the Court preserved what it called the "essential" holding of the 1973 decision, thereby maintaining some kind of constitutional protection for the right to abortion. 217 Nevertheless, the plurality made clear that the test would protect abortion rights less than the trimester framework originally announced in Roe.
218 "The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted," the Casey plurality explained.
219 "Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue."
220
Casey offered some insight into how the undue-burden test applied, upholding all but one of the challenged restrictions. 221 The opinion emphasized that certain informed-consent or parental-consultation regulations would not constitute undue burdens, representing "[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn."
222 By contrast, the Court struck down a spousal-consultation law, Which version of the undue-burden test had the Casey Court adopted? The Court offered no clear guidance on this question. Did the test require the kind of substantial deference demanded by pro-life activists in the 1980s, particularly in the context of the fit between the means and ends of a law? Or did the undue-burden test require the kind of heightened scrutiny that pro-choice attorneys had long called for? The stakes of these questions grew in the decades to come. Inside and outside of court, activists on either side of the abortion question forged definitions of the undue-burden test that seemed likely to make a difference to the future of the abortion wars.
D. Working with Targeted Regulations, Abortion Opponents Reshape the Undue-Burden Test
Pro-life incrementalists recognized that Casey's version of an undueburden test was more protective of abortion rights than the version articulated by Justice O'Connor in earlier dissenting opinions. 224 In 1992, in a confidential analysis of the Casey decision, AUL attorneys explained: "The new test modifies (lowers) both the degree of interference that will constitute an undue burden (a substantial obstacle will now suffice rather than an absolute obstacle or severe limitation) and now states unequivocally that an undue burden imposed before viability will be unconstitutional." 225 At the same time, AUL lawyers saw new potential in Casey for womanprotective arguments that the movement had emphasized since the 1980s.
226
The Court had upheld an informed consent provision, highlighting the potential regret women might experience if they chose abortion without fully understanding its consequences.
227 "Why are the laws upheld in Casey the best news the pro-life movement has received in 20 years?," AUL attorneys wrote in explaining the potential of new "right to know" laws.
228 "Because they can change abortion policy where it counts -in the hearts of women and teenage girls considering abortion." 229 223 See id. at 893-94. 224 See Americans United for Life Briefing Memo, The Good News About Planned Parenthood v. Casey at 3, in THE PRO-LIFE NEWSLETTERS COLLECTION (Jul. 1992) (on file at Carton 1, Americans United for Life Folder, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University). 225 Id. 226 For more on these debates, see infra Part II. 227 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) ("In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed."). 228 Americans United for Life, 1992 Legal and Education Highlights, 3, in The Wilcox Collection, (on file at AUL Briefing Memo Folder, University of Kansas). 229 Id.
In the next decade, AUL and NRLC attorneys debated which strategy would best advance the movement's woman-protective arguments and vision for the undue-burden test, seeing both as crucial to the future of the cause. At a 1993 board meeting, Myrna Gutierrez, a public-relations specialist at AUL, saw a woman-protective message as indispensable to the movement's image. 230 She urged her colleagues to "use cultural and patriotic language to focus on the harm abortion does to the woman." 231 Paige Cunningham reinforced this point, insisting that abortion opponents "must help people understand that abortion hurts the woman too." 232 In Cunningham's view, Casey allowed the movement "to start reducing abortion now by passing and enforcing laws relating to the woman." 233 In the short term, pro-life activists pursued this agenda by promoting "informed consent" laws that expanded on the Casey blueprint. 234 These laws required women to read or listen to a determined list of facts about everything from fetal development to the theoretical availability of child support; other laws required women to hear disputed statements about the connection between abortion and breast cancer or mental illness. 235 By the late 1990s, however, pro-lifers experimented with a more aggressive agenda, promoting bans on the late-term abortion procedure pro-lifers called "partial birth abortion." 236 As Reva Siegel has shown, in defending such laws before the Court, pro-lifers relied on woman-protective arguments. 237 In the same period, pro-life movement members redoubled their efforts to introduce TRAP laws. 238 While Casey did not say anything explicitly about these laws, pro-lifers believed that the Court had signaled an openness to arguments that abortion hurt women, and TRAP laws sent a woman-protective message, albeit a different one from the rationale for right-to-know [Vol. 52 laws: abortion clinics were dangerous and threatened women's physical wellbeing. Pro-lifers often had the most success pushing clinic regulations in the aftermath of health scandals at particular abortion clinics. 239 Movement leaders framed these incidents as evidence that women could not take for granted that any abortion clinic would provide safe treatment. 240 The champions of TRAP laws pitted providers against women, framing abortion as almost universally detrimental to women's health.
At the same time, TRAP laws created a platform for pro-life interpretations of the undue-burden test. The movement used these laws as a vehicle for understandings of the undue-burden test that effectively eliminated any tailoring requirement. If legislators stated an acceptable governmental purpose, there was no need for courts to closely examine whether the law advanced that purpose.
In 1999, for example, South Carolina used this strategy in defending its TRAP law before the Fourth Circuit and in Supreme Court filings. 241 The State had introduced a law requiring the licensure of clinics that performed more than a threshold number of abortions and mandated that the state health department promulgate regulations to govern abortion clinics. 242 Regulators responded by issuing a complex set of rules, requiring among other things that all abortion clinics (and no other freestanding medical facility) undertake extensive physical plant changes, test all patients for both pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and ensure that only a registered nurse, rather than a physician, supervise nursing staff. 243 The State defended these regulations primarily by explaining that the regulations were intended to protect women's health: Regulation 61-12 was drafted and enacted to serve a valid purpose: to promote the State's legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health and welfare of women as well as of the unborn. The regulation is reasonably related to the State's legitimate interest in ensuring that women have abortions performed under safe conditions. This Regulation does not look to strike at a woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion; rather, these regulations look to protect the health of women who seek abortions by ensuring, among many other things, that women will be offered medical tests to determine whether they have venereal diseases which could complicate abortions and cause other health problems; that abortion providers are housed in facilities which are properly equipped to handle the complications associ-ated with abortions; and that women are treated by medical providers who possess the skills required to perform the abortion procedure safely. 244 The State relied on relatively little evidence in making these assertions. With respect to the physical plant requirements, for example, South Carolina relied on a single expert witness with experience constructing ambulatory surgical centers who testified that the regulations would make for safer clinics.
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From South Carolina's standpoint, the undue-burden test required nothing more. 246 Given that the state's regulations simply made abortion more expensive and shuttered only a handful of clinics, the undue-burden test was satisfied, regardless of whether the law actually advanced its stated end. 247 For the providers challenging the regulations, the undue-burden test had a very different meaning. As they explained: "The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence demonstrates that the state may not burden access to abortion with alleged health regulations unless those regulations actually promote maternal health." 248 While the Supreme Court never heard Greenville Women's Clinic, prolife activists continued to see TRAP laws as the perfect way to push both woman-protective reasoning and a new understanding of the undue-burden test. Citing the potential importance of Greenville Women's Clinic, Clarke Forsythe told other AUL members: "In most states, veterinary clinics face more regulations than abortion clinics, which has resulted in numerous deaths of women (the second victims of abortion)." 249 If the movement could convince the Supreme Court that such laws did not fail the undueburden test, Forsythe predicted that the movement would "be in a position to regulate abortion clinics in all 50 states." 250 After Barack Obama's election in 2008, TRAP laws again took on new importance. 251 Without an ally in the White House, pro-lifers refocused on state legislation. 252 In January 2009, NRLC Executive Director David N. O'Steen insisted that, "affiliates can still be effective in passing state legislation," maintaining that such laws had "saved 9 million babies since 1973, a victory that the Obama administration cannot take away." 253 By the time the Court agreed to hear Hellerstedt, twenty-four states had introduced some kind of targeted regulation. 254 Pro-life briefs in Hellerstedt made explicit the longstanding relationship between the movement's embrace of targeted regulations and its reworking of the undue-burden test. In a brief on behalf of Texas legislators who had voted for the challenged law, AUL argued that the undue-burden test required no scrutiny of the fit between the law's means and ends.
"[T]he
State is not required to prove the positive impact of HB 2 in order for a court to determine that the requirement has a rational basis (and is, thus, not an undue burden)," AUL asserted.
256 "The burden is on the Plaintiffs challenging to prove that the State has absolutely no rational justification for enacting the regulation." 257 In turn, amici supporting the challenge to the law revived earlier prochoice understandings of the undue-burden test. While pro-choice lawyers had viewed the undue-burden test with skepticism for some time, Hellerstedt prompted pro-choice attorneys to seize on understandings forged by their movement in earlier decades. In this analysis, the undue-burden test did provide less protection than either an absolute application of the trimester framework or strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, the undue-burden test required a substantial relationship between the means and ends of a law. The petitioners and amici in Hellerstedt drew on these understandings of the undueburden test. For example, the Yale Information Society Project stressed that some attention to the fit between the means and ends of the law is necessary to strike the balance Casey envisions, urging the Court to "examine the evidence to determine whether a statute actually serves a valid interest in order to preserve limitations of a constitutional rule."
258 Briefs submitted by the petitioners and by prominent constitutional scholars adopted a similar stance. fetal-protective statute, should have to actually advance its stated end. Part III then studies how a balancing approach should work with fetal-protective laws. If Casey's balance continues to have meaning, the courts should not take any account of the purpose of a law at face value. The competing constitutional values at stake in the abortion conflict require a harder look.
III. HELLERSTEDT, THE UNDUE-BURDEN TEST, AND MEANS AND ENDS
In resolving the questions about Texas's abortion law, the Hellerstedt Court emphasized the careful balance that Casey had struck between women's interests in liberty, equality, and dignity and the state's interest in fetal life and women's health. To maintain this equilibrium, the Court required evidence that abortion restrictions advance their stated ends.
What comes next? As a matter of strategy, some antiabortion groups have already turned back to laws focused on fetal rights, including "fetal pain" laws that effectively ban abortion after twenty weeks.
260 Hellerstedt offers less guidance about the fate of such laws.
To evaluate what comes next for abortion jurisprudence, this Part begins by examining the balance created in Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II) . Next, the Part analyzes how the Court's decision in Hellerstedt carefully preserves the equilibrium defining Casey/Carhart II. While focusing on woman-protective laws, the Court lays out an approach that should apply with equal force to any abortion regulation. Next, the Part examines how the Court should apply a similarly robust balancing analysis to fetalprotective laws, ensuring that the balance Casey created holds for all abortion regulations, not just a few.
A. Constitutional Balance in Casey/Carhart II
The guiding principle of Casey was respect for the deeply important constitutional values on either side of the abortion question. While preserving the "essential holding" of Roe, the Court rejected the trimester framework and reasoned that it undervalued fetal life. 261 Casey's command to pay more attention to the state's interest in fetal life explained the Court's rejection of Roe's trimester framework.
262 Casey also highlighted the potential value of informed consent laws that made women aware of the moral, political, and legal arguments on both sides of the abortion question. 263 The government could express its belief in the value of fetal life by encouraging women "to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great 260 See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Where the Pro-Life Movement Goes Next, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/where-the-pro-life-movementgoes-next.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8MG4-NYAE. 261 At the same time, Casey recognized that the moral stakes of the abortion question made it all the more important to preserve a woman's liberty to make her own decision about pregnancy. 265 Casey explicitly recognized the personhood of women, connecting liberty in the abortion context to the "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 266 The responsibilities of gestation, childbirth, and childrearing also partly explained the importance of preserving the liberty women enjoyed under Roe. Here, Casey recognized that abortion involved not only questions of the dignity of fetal life but also the equality and dignity of women. 267 As the Court explained, a woman's "suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture."
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The undue-burden test seemed to preserve the equilibrium Casey called for. The Court framed many of the restrictions it upheld as variations on informed consent requirements that made women aware of competing views on abortion without eliminating access. For example, a measure requiring a waiting period, in the Court's view gave women time to deliberate about the important decision they faced. (1985) ("When the state singles out abortion patients or female birth-control patients for special protection from their physicians by mandating waiting periods and detailed disclosure requirements, the state perpetuates outmoded and pernicious stereotypes of women as indecisive and incompetent healthcare consumers, incapable of obtaining necessary information and time for reflection without paternalistic government intervention."). While Casey certainly limited the scope of the abortion right in upholding informed-consent and waiting-period laws, the Court carefully circumscribed those limits, as the Article later describes. 265 269 See id. at 887 ("Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right, it cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects").
On the other hand, when discussing laws designed to protect women's health, Casey ruled out "[u]nnecessary health regulations." 270 Although the Court offered no clarification of when a health regulation became unnecessary, the justices gave insight into what counted as "unnecessary" in analyzing an unconstitutional spousal consultation law. The Court was particularly skeptical of such laws both because they relied on stereotypes about women's role in society and effectively blocked some women from accessing abortion altogether. 271 This analysis showed that under Casey, laws must show respect for the dignity of women as well as the dignity of fetal life. 272 Moreover, Casey's spousal consultation analysis showed that in evaluating the effect of a law, courts ought to consider not only its formal terms but also its practical effect. 273 As this analysis indicated, the purpose and effect of a law were not to be analyzed in isolation. Instead, the Court judged the effect of a law against the strength of the state interest supporting it. Because spousal notification laws advanced a stereotype-laden state interest, the effect of the law on a large fraction of women became even more suspect.
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Casey certainly did not resolve every question involving the relationship between the purpose and effect of the law. When upholding the informed-consent provision, Casey arguably drew on stereotypes about women's ability to make good decisions or to acquire adequate information about what abortion involved on their own -the kind of generalization criticized in the context of spousal notification. 275 Nor was it easy to distinguish the reason women choosing abortion would face an obstacle. Casey suggested that neither the poverty that might prevent women from navigating an informed-consent provision, or a waiting period nor the domestic violence that would prevent women from notifying their spouses could be blamed on the government. 276 Nevertheless, Casey suggested that in least some contexts, the benefits and burdens created by a law had to be balanced against one another.
While suggesting that a far wider range of informed-consent laws might be constitutional, Gonzales v. Carhart did not abandon the idea of balancing developed in Casey. In that case, the Court explicitly recognized an interest in protecting fetal dignity as well as fetal life. State can enhance the dignity of human life by targeting a particularly "brutal" or offensive procedure. 277 The Court measures brutality and offensiveness by looking at the impact of abortion not on the child but on the woman, on third-party observers, or on the larger society. As Carhart II explains, the prohibited abortion procedure, dilation and extraction (D&X), "threatens to further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life." 278 On the Court's theory, D&X procedures pose this threat because they so closely resemble infanticide: "The Court has in the past confirmed the validity of drawing boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are condemned."
279 For observers, permitting such procedures blurs the line between acceptable and unacceptable conduct.
Respecting the value of human life also matters because of the supposed influence of abortion on the woman. The Court identifies the motherchild bond as "an ultimate expression" of respect for human life. 280 Here, Carhart II assumes that women value fetal welfare over anything else and likely would reject abortion if fully informed. Banning D&X abortion protects the woman against regret and facilitates discussion about where her best interests lie. As Carhart II reasons: "The State's interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion."
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While an interest in fetal dignity reaches further than one in fetal life, Carhart II did nothing to change the kind of restriction countenanced by an undue-burden test. Notwithstanding a ban on D&X, women still enjoyed access to abortion. 282 While the Court still saw the importance of balancing the benefits and burdens of the law, the Court's analysis of the importance of 277 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 129 (2007) (hereinafter "Carhart II"). I describe the case as Carhart II to distinguish it from the Supreme Court's earlier ruling on a dilationand-extraction ban. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914 (2000) . 278 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 157. 279 Id. at 158. 280 Id. at 159. 281 Id. at 160. 282 See id. at 165 ("Here the Act allows, among other means, a commonly used and generally accepted method, so it does not construct a substantial obstacle to the abortion right."). Feminists have identified significant problems with the woman-protective arguments at the heart of Carhart II, particularly the stereotypes on which they rely. See, e.g., Reva B. D&X deserved the criticism it received from scholars and medical professionals. 283 These commentators noted that D&X was clearly the safest procedure with certain medical conditions. 284 However, the fact that Carhart II might have misapplied a balancing analysis does not change the fact that it followed the approach that Casey laid out. The Court considered Congress's interest in protecting fetal dignity against the effect of a D&X ban, assuming (likely incorrectly) that the procedure was an uncommon and relatively minor part of reproductive health practice. 285 Moreover, rather than analyzing Congress's intent in isolation, Carhart II evaluated how well the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA) advanced its stated purpose. 286 The Court emphasized the medical uncertainty surrounding the issue of whether D&X was necessary to protect women's health in certain circumstances, finding it too soon to identify an undue burden in a facial attack on the statute. 287 The Court also stressed that the safest, most common procedure, D&E, remained available. 288 The Court weighed the purposes underlying the PBABA against its relatively minor and even uncertain effect on abortion access. In this way, Carhart II explored the relationship between the purpose set for the PBABA and the means used to achieve it.
In addition, the Court framed the ban as a measure designed to ensure that women knew not only about the ethical debate surrounding abortion but also the precise details of the procedure. 289 Carhart II, like Casey, framed certain abortion regulations as laws that were primarily intended to allow women to make more reasoned decisions about abortion, not laws that took the ultimate decision away from a woman altogether. While many had rea-[Vol. 52 son to disagree with the Court's application of a balancing analysis, it seemed that both Casey and Carhart II weighed the benefits and burdens of a law against one another.
Nevertheless, because both opinions were vaguely reasoned and even internally contradictory, neither Casey nor Carhart II resolved the questions raised in social-movement conflict about the meaning of the undue-burden test, but Hellerstedt makes this step all but unavoidable. Next, this Part examines the questions raised in the case before proposing an interpretation of the undue-burden test.
B. Hellerstedt and the Undue-Burden Test
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt involved a challenge to two parts of Texas's HB2, a law passed in 2013. One required any physician performing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles. 290 A second mandated that clinics comply with state regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers. 291 In December 2013, pursuant to this provision, the state introduced regulations on matters from quality standards to physical plant requirements. 292 The cost of building a new facility that complied with the state regulations would be roughly $3 million, while the price of compliance for existing facilities would run between $600,000 and $1 million. 293 In 2013, a group of Texas abortion providers challenged several provisions of HB2, including the admitting privileges requirement. 294 Following a trial on the merits, the district court concluded that the admitting privileges provision would unduly burden a woman's abortion rights. 295 In May 2014, the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the providers had not persuasively shown that the Texas law had no rational basis. 296 Following the adoption of the December 2013 regulations and the impact of the admitting privileges requirement on existing clinics, the Hellerstedt petitioners again filed suit, challenging both the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center 290 measures. 297 After a lengthy trial, the district court concluded that both provisions created an undue burden, 298 and the Fifth Circuit again reversed. 299 In a surprisingly sweeping decision, a five-to-three majority of the Supreme Court struck down both parts of HB2 and infused the undue-burden test with new meaning. 300 After concluding that the petitioners' claim was not barred by res judicata, Justice Breyer's majority opinion took up the proper application of the undue-burden test:
The first part of the Court of Appeals' test may be read to imply that a district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of medical benefits when determining whether a regulation of abortion constitutes an undue burden. The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes together with the benefits those laws confer. 301 As an example of the kind of balancing Casey requires, the Court highlights the analysis of spousal notification and parental involvement laws in the 1992 decision itself. 302 In both instances, the Court not only considered the impact of a law on abortion access but also the value, if any, that the law achieved. 303 Hellerstedt held that a similar balancing applies to any regulation of abortion.
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The Court's decision also offers some guidance as to who will conduct this balancing -and how. Hellerstedt makes clear that courts retain the final decision as to when a law creates an undue burden and should weigh evidence on the subject independently rather than accepting legislative judgments without question. 305 The Court easily reconciled this holding with Carhart II. 306 Recognizing the weight Carhart II gave to Congress's findings on "partial-birth abortion," the Hellerstedt Court emphasized that the Texas legislature that passed HB2 had made no findings at all. 307 Moreover, as Hellerstedt framed it, Carhart II did not reach a conclusion solely on the basis of legislative findings. 308 Indeed, the ultimate decision about whether a [Vol. 52
law constituted an undue burden should remain with a court focused on "the evidence in the record."
309
The nuances of the Court's understanding of an undue burden came through in the majority's exploration of the admitting privilege and ambulatory surgical center requirements. To be sure, Hellerstedt leaves some questions open. The Court reviewed the trial court's findings of fact deferentially, asking whether there was "adequate factual and legal support for the District Court's conclusion [s] ." 310 It is less clear how the Court would respond to a lower court that had deferred more to state legislators or looked less closely at the record.
Nevertheless, Hellerstedt offers some clues about how a lower court should identify an undue burden. First, the Court looked for evidence that either provision of HB2 actually served its stated purpose of protecting women's health. 311 The majority then canvassed the proof cited by the district court in finding that neither law provided a tangible health benefit. 312 Citing peer-reviewed studies, proof in amicus briefs from medical organizations, and expert testimony at trial, the Court also concluded that nothing in the record indicated that women would be safer after HB2 than before. 313 In evaluating the burden imposed by HB2, the Court similarly considered not only the findings of the trial court but also evidence presented in amicus briefs. 316 Alito also would have wanted more evidence that clinics could not have ramped up their services to meet the needs that would be created if other facilities closed. 317 Compared to the majority's analysis, Alito's evaluation was less deferential to the trial court and attached less weight to either the record evidence or the factual arguments offered by amici. The majority's reading of the undue-burden test makes it far easier to establish an undue burden.
In spite of the hints offered by Hellerstedt, the full scope of the undueburden test remains unclear. The majority suggests that courts should balance the benefits and burdens created by a law regardless of its claimed purpose. In particular, Hellerstedt refers to two parts of the Casey opinion 309 See id. 310 Id. at 2311. 311 See id. at 2299. 312 See id. at 2301-04, 2318. 313 See id. at 2310-18. 314 See id. 315 See id. at 2315 (Alito, J., dissenting). 316 See id. at 2345-46. 317 See id. at 2346.
that involved a balancing analysis, those involving spousal and parental involvement. 318 However, nothing in these parts of Casey offers much insight into how the Court should evaluate the kind of fetal protective law most likely to come up for consideration. In the context of Pennsylvania's spousal notification provision, the Court weighed "the husband's interest in the life of the child" against a woman's liberty in making the decision to terminate a pregnancy. 319 Casey did not assume that the state sought primarily to protect fetal life by making abortion harder for some married women to get. 320 For this reason, the Court's opinion reveals little about how balancing would work if the government's interest in fetal life were more directly at stake.
321
Casey's analysis of parental consent laws is even less informative. In discussing Pennsylvania's parental consent law, the Court simply reinforced earlier holdings that "a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure."
322 At most, the Court incorporated by reference the balancing done in other decisions on parental involvement. 323 But even in earlier cases, the Court primarily weighed the minor's liberty interest in terminating a pregnancy against "the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children." 324 While suggesting that courts should always conduct a careful balancing, Hellerstedt tells us very little about how the undue-burden analysis should play out when the government claims to protect fetal life or fetal dignity. It may seem harder to conduct a balancing test when fetal-protective laws are at issue. After all, any abortion restriction arguably protects fetal life somewhat by making abortions harder or more expensive to access. Nevertheless, Hellerstedt offers important guidance about how such an analysis should work. The Article turns next to this analysis.
C. Proof That a Fetal-Protective Law Serves Its Stated Purpose
Undue-burden analysis should require some explanation of how -and how well -a restriction protects fetal life or fetal dignity. By evaluating such an explanation, the Court can smoke out state interests ruled illegitimate by Casey, making for a more meaningful application of Casey's purpose prong. At the same time, the Court should be more skeptical of the effect of a law when it does nothing to achieve its stated goal.
This idea of an undue burden, crafted by pro-choice lawyers and adopted by some members of the Court, differs from conventional strict 318 See id. at 2309. 319 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 898 (1992) . 320 See id. at 876. 321 See id. at 860-902. 322 Id. at 899-901. 323 See id. 324 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 662, 637 (1979) . [Vol. 52 scrutiny -a mode of analysis the Court has avoided in the abortion context. 325 Whereas conventional strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest, the undue-burden test should demand only an important interest, and the Court has already approved of interests in protecting or expressing respect for fetal life or safeguarding women's health. 326 Clearly, the analysis Casey/Hellerstedt advances is not fatal to all abortion regulations. Nor would a tailoring requirement force the State to show that an abortion restriction was the least restrictive means of advancing its interest in fetal life -something often expected under conventional strict scrutiny analysis. 327 Just the same, if Casey balances the interests of women and fetal life, the state should not be able to satisfy the undue-burden test simply by asserting a fetal protective interest. First, trial courts should not accept at face value that a fetal protective law accomplishes its stated ends. For example, some fetal protective laws rely on questionable medical assumptions. 328 Fetal pain statutes assume that unborn children experience physical suffering before most medical professionals believe pain to be possible. 329 Courts should not prejudge laws based on factual premises that are controversial at best, even if the state claims to protect the unborn child.
Other fetal-protective laws seem primarily focused on the perceptions of bystanders rather than fetal pain or death. Consider the bans on what prolifers call "dismemberment abortion," a term widely believed to include dilation and evacuation, the most common second trimester abortion procedure. 330 In a pamphlet on these laws, the National Right to Life Committee emphasizes that they would put a stop to procedures "laden with the power to devalue human life." 331 These laws, as the NRLC explain, operate not primarily to preserve fetal life but to "foster . . . respect for life" and "protect . . . the integrity of the medical profession."
332
Given its importance in Casey, the state's interest in expressing a point of view about fetal life should not be dismissed out of hand, particularly since the government may express its own views under the First Amendment. 333 Nevertheless, an interest in protecting fetal dignity or medical integrity is vague and harder to limit than one involving fetal life. How can courts know if the existence of a particular procedure will undermine the reputation of medical professionals? Might the availability of legal abortion enhance doctors' reputation, at least under certain circumstances? Courts should take a harder look at laws premised on the protection of the medical profession. Such statutes rely on factual assumptions that both parties should be able to dispute at trial. While Carhart II explicitly recognizes these interests, the Court has not explained how weighty they are when compared to the state's goal of protecting fetal life. Hellerstedt offers reason to be more skeptical of laws claimed to serve these alternate state goals.
Courts should also view laws claimed to protect fetal dignity with some skepticism. States should offer explanation as to why a particular abortion procedure especially impacts public attitudes about fetal worth. Like most medical procedures, the details of abortion procedures can be hard to stomach. Given that such procedures end fetal life, abortions might particularly trouble bystanders. But unless an interest in fetal dignity could justify a blanket ban on all abortions -something clearly off limits given the balance struck by Casey -states should have to do more than proclaim an interest in fostering respect for life. If lawmakers believe that one or another technique is particularly disturbing, legislators should clearly state the reasons for this belief and defend their position in court, even when courts consider the possibility that other abortion procedures could have similar effects on bystanders.
In the context of fetal-protective laws, courts should further weigh whatever benefits a law provides against the limits it imposes on abortion access. If a law does little to protect fetal life while severely limiting abortion access, the courts should take this as a signal that a proclaimed interest in fetal life may be mere pretext. Moreover, to give meaning to the balance Casey demands, courts should ask not only whether a law nominally advances an interest in fetal life but also how much value the law adds, particularly when weighed against the woman's interest in abortion access.
In evaluating how much a law restricts access, the courts should consider the kind of proof validated by Hellerstedt -"direct evidence and plausible inferences" -that a law will force clinics to close, compromise [Vol. 52 women's health, or otherwise eliminate access. To be sure, as the Carhart II Court recognized, lawmakers may act even in the face of scientific, medical, or factual uncertainty about the impact of a law. However, read together, Hellerstedt and Carhart II require courts to weigh all of the record evidence, including but not limited to legislative findings.
If the state has to demonstrate that abortion restrictions were properly tailored, the constitutionality of fetal-pain laws -and several others beyond those challenged in Hellerstedt -would fall into question. Fetal pain laws have enjoyed strong support among abortion opponents, and at least twelve states, including Texas, have already introduced them. 334 Such laws ban abortion at the point that a fetus can purportedly experience pain, often at or before the twentieth week of pregnancy. 335 As an initial matter, given disputed evidence about when pain sensitivity develops, experts disagree about whether such statutes actually protect unborn children against anything. 336 Even if the evidence supporting fetal pain prior to viability is weak as it seems, the state would have reason to express concern about fetal suffering, particularly late in a woman's pregnancy. Just the same, many fetal-pain bans prohibit access to abortion across the board after a certain point in pregnancy, without a showing that the state has properly considered countervailing interests, including the health of women or the pain suffered by children who are born and who suffer from the aftermath of certain fetal abnormalities. 337 Fetal pain laws do not put enough value on women's interests in autonomy, equality, or bodily integrity. Even if one does not question the legitimacy of the scientific evidence surrounding fetal pain, existing laws would likely fail the undue-burden test given the mismatch between the means and ends of the law.
Other abortion restrictions would be even more suspect if the state had to demonstrate a fit between the means and ends used to protect fetal life. Fetal heartbeat laws of the kind struck down in North Dakota ban all but the earliest abortions, tilting the balance of competing interests too far in favor of fetal life and all but ignoring women's interests in dignity and equality. 338 Fetal dismemberment laws, like one recently passed in Kansas, 339 seem equally problematic. Although many states have considered such laws, only Oklahoma has introduced a similar measure. 340 In defending such laws, prolifers invoke the interest in fetal dignity recognized in Carhart II. 341 A procedure that is arguably visually disturbing could have the same impact on the reputation of the medical profession and the coarsening of the culture mentioned in Carhart II. While Carhart II recognized an interest in fetal dignity that was hard to quantify, a similar move would be far more disturbing in the context of fetal-dismemberment bans, particularly since such laws would outlaw the most common and safe second-trimester technique. 342 The Carhart II Court there recognized that dilation and evacuation is unquestionably the safest and most widely used second-trimester procedurea method that many women require to achieve a good health outcome. While other procedures theoretically remain available under Kansas or Oklahoma's law, these alternatives are unproven and uncommon. 343 Entirely outlawing such an often-used and important procedure because bystanders find it disturbing or disgusting does not balance women's rights with the state's interest in fetal life.
Would such a test ever allow the Court to uphold an abortion restriction? Hellerstedt and Carhart II suggest that the answer to this question is yes. Based on Carhart II's reading of the medical evidence, states may restrict abortion when advancing interests in fetal life when doing so would have little impact on women's autonomy, equality, or safety. As Carhart II suggests, lawyers on opposing sides of the abortion wars will inevitably disagree about how much of an impact a law has, particularly when a vague interest like fetal dignity is in play. What is clear is that Hellerstedt's balancing requires a meaningful look at the purpose and impact of every law, including those claimed to protect fetal life.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hellerstedt comes at the end of a long conflict about the meaning of the undue-burden test. The idea of an undue burden first took shape when prochoice lawyers recognized that the Court had moved away from a strict application of the trimester framework. In developing an alternative, these [Vol. 52 lawyers looked first to unconstitutional conditions doctrine, describing the obstacles women faced when forced to choose between badly needed governmental benefits and the exercise of a protected right. After this doctrine fell out of use, movement attorneys updated these arguments, using the undue-burden test to argue that courts should scrutinize the fit between the means and ends of abortion regulations.
In cases on abortion funding, pro-lifers responded by developing a different version of the undue-burden test, asking the courts to closely examine only those obstacles directly traceable to state law. By mid-decade, abortion opponents had broadened the use of an undue-burden test, claiming that it represented a version of rational-basis review.
In the past several decades, competing views about the meaning of the undue-burden test have circulated on the Supreme Court and in movement circles, particularly in the context of TRAP laws. At least in the context of woman-protective abortion regulations, Hellerstedt brings this contest to the surface. The Court should clarify that the undue-burden test always requires analysis of the fit between the means and ends of law. Anything else would betray Casey's promise.
